Counterinsurgency

DOS_DOD_Counterinsurgency_Conference.pdf (application/pdf Object)

Amb. Edelman's Remarks at the Department of State and Department of Defense Counterinsurgent Conference at
the Ronald Reagan Building, Wash. D.C.

NEW STRATEGY AND TOOLS FOR THE GLOBAL INSURGENCY
The effort to learn from the past is relevant not only to Afghanistan and Iraq, but also to the global insurgency we face more
broadly. Although much progress has been made in crippling the leadership of the Al-Qaeda network, it would be premature
to declare victory and simply come home as some have suggested.
It would also be unwise to assume that in order to defeat this enemy we will not need new tools.
A number of scholars have asserted that today’s insurgencies have evolved. For instance, today’s enemy is highly adaptive,
trans-nationally connected, media-savvy, and networked. In this environment, we cannot blindly graft old methods onto new
strategies. We must determine what “classic” counterinsurgency approaches still work and what new approaches are
required. This necessitates an adaptation of our traditional counterinsurgency theory.
One example of this dilemma is troop strength. What is the proper ratio of security forces (military and police) to a given
population? An often cited rule of thumb is approximately 20 soldiers per 1000 residents. A recent study by the Army’s
Combat Studies Institute in Fort Leavenworth attempted to derive the “right” ratio based on historical analysis. Although the
numbers varied significantly across cases, the average turned out to be 13.26 soldiers per 1000 inhabitants or 91.82
residents per soldier. But, the study’s own Forward warns that these results “cannot be used to guarantee victory by simply
putting a certain number of soldiers ‘on the ground’ relative to the indigenous population. The percentages and numbers in