Electronic Warfare in China's Past, Present, and Future - Storming Media

Electronic Warfare in China's Past, Present, and Future - Storming Media

The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2007 report by the DOD suggests that, in addition to the Red Army's army, navy, air force and rocket arms, the Chinese government is putting together a team to deal with "electronic and online arenas ".

"China's concept of an 'information blockade' likely extends beyond the strictly military realm to include other elements of state power." The report suggests that the People's Republic of China is developing teams to handle computer network attack, defense and exploitation with a separate section handling electronic countermeasures. It cites logistics systems and satellite communications as possible targets, and claims that exercises have been held in cooperation with other Red Army arms since 2005.

French extremists dream of jihad in Iraq

In a French radio interview broadcast from Baghdad in 2003, he urged Parisian friends to join him on the battlefields. "I'm ready to set off dynamite and boom! Boom! We kill all the Americans!" he said on RTL radio.

In court, while he didn't deny his radio appeal, el Hakim said some of his statements to police were made under duress and that his role in Iraq was primarily "humanitarian."

Investigators say the alleged network funneled about a dozen French fighters to camps linked to al-Qaida in Iraq head Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and sought to send more before he was killed in a U.S. airstrike in 2006. At least seven French insurgents have died, some in suicide bombings, police say.

The classified case file could fill a suitcase. It includes transcripts of taped phone conversations; suspects' family trees; extremist Islamic sermons; excerpts from a Web site explaining how to use Kalashnikov rifles; and grainy images of dozens of people questioned in the case.

DEVELOPING STRATEGIC LEADERS

DEVELOPING STRATEGIC LEADERS
FOR THE 21st CENTURY)

This analysis considers existing efforts in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), State Department,
and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and provides
appropriate recommendations for each. It also outlines
the changes required to existing personnel management
systems and development programs to create an
effective cadre of civilian national security professionals
for the policy process. Clearly, these recommendations
may be applicable for other executive agencies as
well. These three departments were selected because
they have traditionally had the primary (if not exclusive)
role in the development of foreign and defense policy.
There are also obviously growing requirements
for those with technical expertise, human resource
management, finance/comptroller skills, etc. The
development of personnel with these talents for these
three agencies is not the subject of this monograph.

Report20060203.pdf (application/pdf Object)

Quadrennial Defense Review Report

Such terrorist networks oppose globalization
and the expansion of freedom it brings.
Paradoxically, they use the very instruments of
globalization – the unfettered fl ow of information
and ideas, goods and services, capital, people
and technology – as their preferred means of
attack. Th ey target symbols of modernity like
skyscrapers with civilian jetliners used as missiles.
Th ey exploit the Internet as a cyber-sanctuary,
which enables the transfer of funds and the crosstraining
of geographically isolated cells. Th ey use
cell phones and text messaging to order attacks
and detonate car bombs. They send pre-recorded
video messages to sympathetic media outlets to
distribute their propaganda “free of charge” and
to spread their ideology of hate. They encourage
terrorist “startup franchises” around the world
that conduct attacks in copy-cat fashion. They
depend on 24/7 news cycles for the publicity
they seek to attract new recruits. Th ey plan to
attack targets from safe-houses half a world away.
Th ey seek weapons of mass destruction from
transnational proliferation networks.

Progress to Date. Th e foundation for net-centric
operations is the Global Information Grid
(GIG), a globally interconnected, end-to-end set
of trusted and protected information networks.
Th e GIG optimizes the processes for collecting,
processing, storing, disseminating, managing and
sharing information within the Department and
with other partners. Th e Department has made
steady progress implementing net-centric systems
and concepts of operation. It has deployed an
enhanced land-based network and new satellite
constellation as part of the Transformational
Communication Architecture to provide
high-bandwidth, survivable internet protocol
communications. Together, they will support
battle-space awareness, time-sensitive targeting
and communications on the move.

Authorities developed before the age of the
Internet and globalization have not kept pace
with trans-national threats from geographically
dispersed non-state terrorist and criminal
networks. Authorities designed during the Cold
War unduly limit the ability to assist police forces
or interior ministries and are now less applicable.
Adversaries’ use of new technologies and
methods has outstripped traditional concepts of
national and international security. Traditional
mechanisms for creating and sustaining
international cooperation are not sufficiently
agile to disaggregate and defeat adversary
networks at the global, regional and local levels
simultaneously. Supporting the rule of law and building civil

Counterinsurgency

DOS_DOD_Counterinsurgency_Conference.pdf (application/pdf Object)

Amb. Edelman's Remarks at the Department of State and Department of Defense Counterinsurgent Conference at
the Ronald Reagan Building, Wash. D.C.

NEW STRATEGY AND TOOLS FOR THE GLOBAL INSURGENCY
The effort to learn from the past is relevant not only to Afghanistan and Iraq, but also to the global insurgency we face more
broadly. Although much progress has been made in crippling the leadership of the Al-Qaeda network, it would be premature
to declare victory and simply come home as some have suggested.
It would also be unwise to assume that in order to defeat this enemy we will not need new tools.
A number of scholars have asserted that today’s insurgencies have evolved. For instance, today’s enemy is highly adaptive,
trans-nationally connected, media-savvy, and networked. In this environment, we cannot blindly graft old methods onto new
strategies. We must determine what “classic” counterinsurgency approaches still work and what new approaches are
required. This necessitates an adaptation of our traditional counterinsurgency theory.
One example of this dilemma is troop strength. What is the proper ratio of security forces (military and police) to a given
population? An often cited rule of thumb is approximately 20 soldiers per 1000 residents. A recent study by the Army’s
Combat Studies Institute in Fort Leavenworth attempted to derive the “right” ratio based on historical analysis. Although the
numbers varied significantly across cases, the average turned out to be 13.26 soldiers per 1000 inhabitants or 91.82
residents per soldier. But, the study’s own Forward warns that these results “cannot be used to guarantee victory by simply
putting a certain number of soldiers ‘on the ground’ relative to the indigenous population. The percentages and numbers in

050307Felter.pdf (application/pdf Object)

THE INTERNET: A PORTAL TO VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM

The most important thought leaders in al-Qa`ida are not Usama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa`ida’s most well-known operational leaders. Rather, they are people unknown to most Americans, people like Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Abd al-Qadir ibn Abd al-Aziz and Abu Qatada al-Filistini.

There is clear evidence that the grand ideas developed by these scholars and other ideologues lesser known in the West informs and inspires terrorist attacks worldwide. For example, the Spanish indictment of the Madrid train bombers identifies more than 50 electronic books that had been downloaded from the internet and were found on the hard drives of the bombers’ computers. The authors of those books track very closely with the list of the most influential Jihadi authors developed by our researchers at West Point. Their writings are being exported around the globe thanks to the internet. Thus, an electronic book by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the most influential Jihadi ideologue based on our empirical assessment, is one the most translated texts in Indonesia today.

Volume I, Issue 4

Perspectives on Terrorism -

Al-Qaeda’s Propaganda Advantage and How to Counter It

By Brigitte L. Nacos

In early 2006, Jarret Brachman and William McCants published an article entitled “Stealing al-Qa’ida’s Playbook,” that examined the writings of several prominent Jihadi scholars, among them Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s second in command. Within weeks, al-Zawahiri released a video commenting on the article and mentioning that the review was based on research conducted at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Originally posted on an extremist Internet site, the video was eventually available on Google as well. [1] In response to al-Zawahiri’s review of the article, Brachman remarked that “postmodern doesn’t quite capture it.” [2] Perhaps not, but the incident illustrated how today’s terrorists—even those hiding in the most remote places—can and do utilize global information and communication networks that did not exist a decade or so earlier or were not easily accessible.

Perspectives on Terrorism -

Complex Systems Problems in the War of Ideas

The problem with the message influence model of communication is that it’s wrong. When we’re taking about human systems, rather than telephone systems, the transmitter and receiver are people, and the source and destination are their minds. Communication is not as simple as transferring my thoughts to your mind through my mouth and your ears. Complex processes of expression and interpretation mediate our interaction. They are affected not just by the traits and experiences of the people involved, but also by the contexts they find themselves in at the time of communication. For example, “freedom” might mean one thing to an American (freedom to do things), but another to a Middle Easterner (freedom from corrupting influences).

Much more to the point of complex systems, a critical flaw of the old message influence model is that it treats the elements as independent bits that we can break down and optimize. Theorist Niklas Luhmann [8] rejected this idea, believing instead that communication is a property of a complex system in which participants interpret one-another’s actions and make attributions about the thoughts, motivations, and intentions behind them. The complexity arises because of a double contingency. Given two communicators, A and B,

• The success of A’s behavior depends not only on external conditions, but on what B does and thinks.
• But what B does and thinks is influenced by A’s behavior as well as B’s expectations, interpretations, and attributions with respect to A.

Just as the U.S. government believes in the simple message influence model of communication, it also believes the search for the right message takes place on a simple landscape. The U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (NSPDSC) [12] released last year provides a good example. It assumes the best message has already been found and sets it out in a set of broad talking points that promote American values and strategic objectives. Most of the document talks about how to optimize various aspects of delivering the message, such as coordination between agencies involved, making use of better spokespeople, and so on.

But in fact, the landscape of U.S. Strategic Communication is a rugged one because of the tight coupling of elements of the system. Multiple agencies have responsibility for strategic communication and sometimes work at cross purposes. Some spokespeople are better suited for some audiences than others. Messages intended for one audience “leak” to other audiences creating mixed messages. Audiences, even as conceived in the NSPDSC, are not independent: “Girls,” one of its target audiences, are also “youth,” another of its target audiences. These are but a few examples of interdependencies in the system that make the search landscape rugged.

Hearts & Minds

U.S. National Strategy for
Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication)

MISSION AND PRIORITIES
The strength, success and security of the United States of America rest on our commitment to certain fundamental values and principles. These values gave birth to our nation, and govern our actions in the world. We believe all individuals, men and women, are equal and entitled to basic human rights, including freedom of speech, worship and political participation. While the forms of government will vary, we believe all people deserve to live in just societies that protect individual and common rights, fight corruption and are governed by the rule of law. Across the world, America seeks to work with other governments and nations in a spirit of partnership that supports human dignity and fosters peace and progress.
The National Security Strategy of the United States establishes eight national security objectives:
-To champion human dignity;
-To strengthen alliances against terrorism;
-To defuse regional conflicts;
-To prevent threats from weapons of mass destruction;
-To encourage global economic growth;
-To expand the circle of development;
-To cooperate with other centers of global power; and
-To transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.
Public diplomacy and strategic communication should always strive to support our nation’s fundamental values and national security objectives. All communication and public diplomacy activities should:
-Underscore our commitment to freedom, human rights and the dignity and equality of every human being;
-Reach out to those who share our ideals;
-Support those who struggle for freedom and democracy; and
-Counter those who espouse ideologies of hate and oppression.

Abu Yahya’s Six Easy Steps for Defeating al-Qaeda

olume I, Issue 5

Perspectives on Terrorism -

By Jarret Brachman

In his 10 September 2007 video release, Shaikh Abu Yahya al-Libi offered the United States several unsolicited tips for better prosecuting its ‘war of ideas’ against al-Qaeda.[1] Although his comments brought al-Qaeda propaganda to new heights of arrogance, the fact is that Abu Yahya’s recommendations are nothing short of brilliant. Policymakers who are serious about degrading the resonance of the Jihadist message, therefore, would be remiss in ignoring his strategic recommendations simply because of their source.

Abu Yahya, a senior member of al-Qaeda, is one of the world’s foremost experts on the strengths and vulnerabilities of the contemporary Jihadist Movement. He became a household name within the counterterrorism community when al-Qaeda began marketing him in their propaganda following his July 2005 escape from detention at Bagram air base in Afghanistan. In the past two years, Abu Yahya has become the al-Qaeda High-Command’s attack dog, chastising a variety of Muslim groups for failing to follow the proper path: with the Shia, Hamas and the Saudi royal family seemingly bearing the brunt of his rage.[2] Al-Qaeda has also promoted Abu Yahya’s softer side, showing him reciting poetry and informally dining with his students. He has become, in a very real sense, the Jihadist for all seasons.

Abu Yahya’s decision to volunteer strategic advice to the United States was neither out of goodwill nor self-destructive tendencies. Rather, his comments embodied the explosive cocktail of youth, rage, arrogance and intellect that has made him a force among supporters of the Jihadist Movement. By casually offering his enemy a more sophisticated counter-ideological strategy than the U.S. has been able to implement or articulate to date, Abu Yahya’s point was clear: the U.S. lags so far behind the global Jihadist Movement in its war of ideas that al-Qaeda has little to fear any time soon.

Abu Yahya’s strategic plan for improving America’s counter-ideology efforts centers on turning the Jihadist Movement’s own weaknesses against it. He first suggests that governments interested in weakening the ideological appeal of al-Qaeda’s message should focus on amplifying the cases of those ex-Jihadists (or “backtrackers” as he calls them) who have willingly renounced the use of armed action and recanted their previously held ideological commitments. Using retractions by senior thinkers and religious figures who already have established followings within the Jihadist Movement helps to sow seeds of doubt across the Movement and deter those on the ideological fence from joining.

Although Arab governments, most notably the Saudis and the Egyptians, have successfully leveraged this approach for decades, there may be particular value in amplifying these retractions in the West. In November 2007, for instance, the legendary Egyptian Jihadist thinker, Dr. Sayyid Imam Sharif, released a book renouncing his previous commitment to the violent Jihadist ideology.[3] As could be expected given Sharif’s senior stature in the Movement, the story made front-page news across the Arab world. In the English-language media, however, the story was little more than a minor blip. The media’s non-coverage of such a major ideological victory against global Jihadism is due to the fact that few in the West appreciate Sayyid Imam’s significance to groups like al-Qaeda.

Abu Yahya suggests that the public media can play an effective role in publicizing ideological retractions, particularly by conducting interviews with those reformed scholars, publishing their articles and printing their books. The media’s effort to promote the retractions helps to redirect public attention away from the role of the host government in prompting those retractions in the first place. The more distance these reformed scholars have from their host governments the more they are likely to be perceived as legitimate.

Abu Yahya also recommends that the United States both fabricate stories about Jihadist mistakes and exaggerate real Jihadist mistakes whenever they are made. These may include blaming Jihadist terrorism for killing innocents, particularly women, children and the elderly. But he does not stop there. Jihadist mistakes should not simply be highlighted as being anomalous or extraordinary: rather, governments ought to characterize them as being at the core of the Jihadist methodology. In short, governments need to convince their populations that the murder of innocent people is a core part of global Jihadism.

The most effective way to pursue this strategy, he contends, is to exploit mistakes made by any Jihadist group, whether they are al-Qaeda or not, by casting that action as being emblematic of the entire Jihadist Movement. Abu Yahya calls this strategy of blurring the differences between al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups when it serves propaganda purposes, “widening the circle.” Pursing this strategy offers the United States significantly more exploitable opportunities for discrediting the actions of the Jihadist Movement writ large.

Abu Yahya provides two clarifying examples of existing counterpropaganda initiatives that he found to be effective in damaging the Jihadist Movement’s credibility. The first example is the rumor about an al-Qaeda constitution that stated that death should be the penalty for quitting al-Qaeda. Although Abu Yahya claims that the rumor is fabricated, he concedes that it has effectively painted al-Qaeda in a negative light within the Islamic world.

He also points to how the Saudi and Algerian governments successfully characterized Jihadist terrorist attacks against government targets in their countries as actually being attacks against the people of those countries. By downplaying the iconic significance of the buildings and focusing instead on the human victims, casting them as powerless and ordinary, both the Saudis and the Algerians were able to “move emotions” and “whip up storms” across the public against the Jihadist Movement.

Abu Yahya’s third strategic point deals with the government’s prompting of mainstream Muslim clerics to issue fatwas (religious rulings) that incriminate the Jihadist Movement and their actions. Abu Yahya shudders at other Muslims’ use of “repulsive legal terms, such as bandits, Khawarij (literally, “those who seceded,” refers to the earliest Islamic sect) and even Karamathians or al-Qaramitah, (“extreme fanatics”) in referring to the Jihadists. Abu Yahya is not the first to make these points, however. In fact, followers of the Saudi Salafist shaikh, Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, frequently used the following terms in order to assault the Jihadists:

- “Jihadi:” Anyone who believes that Jihad is a purely individual duty to fight

- “Takfiri:” Anyone who excommunicates Arab rulers or Muslims

- “Khariji Bandit:” Anyone who actively seeks to overthrow Arab rulers

- “Qutubi:” Anyone who reveres, quotes or even positively mentions Sayyid Qutb (an early hard-line Egyptian thinker)

- “Hizbi:” Anyone who participates in anti-establishment activist group

- “Dirty Groundhog”: a traitor to one’s religion, used specifically against Saudi hard-line cleric, Shaikh Hamoud bin Uqla as-Shuaybi in the 1990s

- “Rabid Dogs”: a generic label for extremists

- “The Dog”: referring specifically to Usama Bin Ladin

- “Perennial Defender of Innovators”: an attack against extremists for rejecting centuries of accepted historical teachings and interpretations of Islam

- “Betrayer of the Salafi Way”: used to attack hard-line clerics who step outside the bounds of mainstream Islamic conservatism.[4]

Abu Yahya also points to the effectiveness of special committees of scholars who try to deprogram Jihadists in prison. These rehabilitation programs, which are now operating in Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, have become a central part of these countries’ efforts to weaken the Jihadist Movement, at least in the war of ideas.[5]

The fourth component to Abu Yahya’s proposed grand strategy is strengthening and backing Islamic movements far removed from Jihad, particularly those with a democratic approach. Beyond supporting them, he counsels governments to push these mainstream groups into ideological conflict with Jihadist groups in order to keep the Jihadist scholars and propagandists busy responding to their criticisms. This approach is designed to strip the Jihadist Movement of its monopoly on the dialogue and instead unleash a “torrential flood of ideas and methodologies which find backing, empowerment, and publicity from numerous parties” against them.

There is no doubt that the Jihadist thinkers are most threatened by groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas as well as mainstream Salafists. This is because these groups draw on many of the same religious texts and appeal to the same constituencies for recruitment and financial support.[6] The methodologies of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, however, are significantly more palatable to their host governments than Jihadists. This bitter rivalry between Jihadists and those more moderated groups could be usefully exploited by governments interested in wearing down al-Qaeda’s stamina.

Next, Abu Yahya’s recommends aggressively neutralizing or discrediting the guiding thinkers of the Jihadist Movement. His point is that not all Jihadists are replaceable: there are some individuals who provide a disproportionate amount of insight, scholarship or charisma. These individuals include key ideologues like Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Qatada or Sayyid Imam Sharif; and senior commanders like, Khattab, Yousef al-Ayiri or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

In order to effectively degrade the Jihadist Movement’s long-term capacity, Abu Yahya suggests that these Jihadist luminaries need to be silenced, either through death, imprisonment or perceived irrelevance, thereby leaving the Movement “without an authority in which they can put their full confidence and which directs and guides them, allays their misconceptions, and regulates their march with knowledge, understanding, and wisdom.”

The consequence of this power vacuum, he argues, is that “those who have not fully matured on this path or who are hostile to them in the first place, to spread whatever ideas and opinions they want and to cause disarray and darkness in the right vision which every Mujahid must have.”

Finally, Abu Yahya advises the United States to spin the minor disagreements among leaders or Jihadist organizations as being major doctrinal and methodological disputes. He suggests that any disagreement, be it over personal, strategic or theological reasons, can be exacerbated by using them as the basis for designating new subsets, or schools-of-thought. These fractures can also serve as useful inroads on which targeted information operations can be focused: such an environment becomes a “safe-haven for rumormongers, deserters, and demoralizers, and the door is left wide open for defamation, casting doubts, and making accusations and slanders,” he explains.

This “war of defamation” as he terms it, leaves the Jihadist propagandists almost impotent in that no matter how they try to defend themselves, dispel misconceptions, and reply to accusations, their voice will be as “hoarse as someone shouting in the middle of thousands of people.”

In the case of the 10 September 2007 video, Abu Yahya may have let his ego undermine his goal of intimidating the West by offering useful strategic advice. Abu Yahya’s most important contribution is identifying that the best way to defeat al-Qaeda is by tying it up in knots: Al-Qaeda must be continuously forced into a series of compromising positions from a variety of angles so that it hangs itself over the long term. The challenge for the United States is that it is not currently positioned to implement many of Abu Yahya’s strategies, which is why he most likely felt fine sharing them. The fact is that the U.S. is speaking from a non-Islamic perspective, which discredits anything it says regarding the Islamic faith. Furthermore, there is little the U.S. government can say to the Islamic world that will be viewed as anything other than propaganda in support of its military occupation of Iraq as long as it maintains forces on the ground there. The U.S., therefore, must be open to, and innovative with, creating and leveraging a variety of flexible partnerships in its global efforts to degrade the appeal and legitimacy of al-Qaeda over the long-term.

Jarret Brachman is the Director of Research at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center.

NOTES:

[1] Abu Yahya al-Libi. 93-minute video tape. Produced by As-Sahab. Recorded early Sha'ban 1428.

[2] See Michael Scheuer, "Abu Yahya al-Libi: Al-Qaeda's Theological Enforcer - Part 1," in the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus, Volume 4, Issue 25 (July 31, 2007) for an in-depth examination of Abu Yahya’s recent statements.

[3] The book, Rationalizations on Jihad in Egypt and the World, is being released in serialized format by the Egyptian daily newspaper, Al-Masry al-Youm, November and December 2007.

[4]“Summary of the Deviation of The Madkhalee 'Salafiyyah.'” At-Tibyan Publications.

[5] See Christopher Boucek’s “Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia” in the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

[6] For a more in-depth discussion of these dynamics, see The Militant Ideology Atlas. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. http://ctc.usma.edu/atlas/ .

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Note: Perspectives on Terrorism invites a diversity of opinions to be presented in articles. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Perspectives on Terrorism or the Terrorism Research Initiative.

Syria tightens Internet monitoring, jails bloggers - San Jose Mercury News

Syria tightens Internet monitoring, jails bloggers



DAMASCUS, Syria - Syria is cracking down more on Internet use, imposing tighter monitoring of citizens who link to the Web, as well as jailing bloggers who criticize the government and blocking YouTube and other Web sites deemed harmful to state security.

The tighter hand is coming even as Syrian officials show off a press center with fast Internet access and wireless technology for journalists covering this weekend's Arab League summit. The clampdown doesn't appear to be tied to the summit.

In recent days, authorities extended restrictions on Web use by requiring owners of Internet cafes to keep detailed logs of their customers, apparently to make it easier to track down anyone deemed to be a threat.

The rules, conveyed orally by security agents, require Internet cafes to record a client's full name, ID or passport number, the computer used and the amount of time spent on the device. The logs must be available to show to security agents upon demand.

The Challenge of Islamism - Harvard - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

The Challenge of Islamism - Harvard - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs See 23:00 for media effects on Islam

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"The Neo-Talibans" - Al-Jazeera TV Documentary on the Mentality and Methods of the Taliban

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Jihad in China: Internet Video Depicts Islamists Training and Incites to Jihad