Al-Suri's Doctrines for Decentralized Jihadi Training - Part 1

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Al-Suri's Doctrines for Decentralized Jihadi Training - Part 1

Using his most common pen names—Abu Mus'ab al-Suri and Umar Abd al-Hakim—he has written a 1,600 page treatise, The Call to Global Islamic Resistance, which is among the most frequently mentioned jihadi strategy books.

Combining his newly acquired military skills with his previous training in mechanical engineering at the Faculty of Engineering at the University of Aleppo, he co-authored a handbook in explosive engineering, which was then his specialty. Al-Suri claims that this handbook, which became known as "The Syrian Memorandum," was later used in the Arab-Afghan camps in Afghanistan. In July 1987, al-Suri met with Abdullah Azzam, the godfather of the Arab volunteers in Afghanistan, and was quickly enlisted as a military instructor.

Following the publication of his 900 page treatise The Islamic Jihadi Revolution in Syria, published in Peshawar in May 1991, he gradually emerged as a jihadi writer and theoretician of some stature.

The book was a frontal attack on the Muslim Brotherhood and was in many ways a Syrian parallel to Ayman al-Zawahiri's The Muslim Brothers' Bitter Harvest in Sixty Years, which appeared at the same time.

Both works were part of the intellectual foundation for the radical jihadi trend that emerged as a considerable force inside the Arab-Afghan movement after Azzam's death in November 1989.

As opposed to many other jihadi writers, al-Suri always strived to maintain a practical and "operative" perspective, emphasizing the need to learn from past mistakes and devise new practical "operative theories" (nazariyat al-'amal) for future jihadi campaigns [4]. In his most important works, he focused on explaining how jihadi groups should operate in order to survive in the new post-Cold War context characterized by enhanced international anti-terrorism cooperation and the progressive elimination of terrorist sanctuaries and safe havens

all of al-Suri's operative theories are built on the premise that the tanzim model—the centralized hierarchical and regional secret jihadi organization—has outlived its role. Their Achilles' heel was their hierarchical structure, which meant that if one member was caught, the whole organization would be at peril.

Al-Suri, therefore, recommends that future jihadi warfare should be concentrated around other forms, namely the "jihad of individual terrorism," practiced by self-contained autonomous cells in combination with jihadi participation on "Open Fronts," wherever such fronts are possible

Hence, the practice of "individual terrorism" is a core theme in al-Suri's most recent writings, and it is rooted in his most famous slogan: nizam, la tanzim (System, not Organization) [6]. In other words, there should be "an operative system" or template available anywhere for anybody wishing to participate in the global jihad either on one's own or with a small group of trusted associates, and there should not exist any "organization for operations."
(This goal parallels that of Al Battar Online training camp of Al Qaeda (mem).

The decisive factor for successful jihadi training is the moral motivation and the desire to fight, not knowledge in the use of arms, al-Suri asserts.

Al-Suri finds the religious foundation for jihadi training in two Quranic verses, namely verse 60 of Surat al-Anfal and verse 46 of Surat al-Tawbah. The former is perhaps the most frequently cited Quranic verse among jihadis. It contains an injunction to prepare for "striking terror in the hearts of the enemies" [12]. It has therefore been a point of departure for a considerable number of jihadi writings on the legitimacy of "terrorism" in Islam [13]. Verse 46 of Surat al-Tawbah, "And if they had wished to go forth they would assuredly have made ready some equipment, but Allah was averse to their being sent forth and held them back and it was said (unto them): Sit ye with the sedentary," demonstrates, according to al-Suri, God's disgrace over the hypocrites who fail to prepare for war [14]. He concludes from reading these two verses that there are three stages in the performance of jihad: "will...preparation...launch."

"The Changing Face of Terror: A Post 9/11 Assessment," Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton, Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, Washington, DC, June 13, 2006, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm2/68608.htm.

I mentioned this two weeks ago in a post highlighting the defining work on Nasar, Brynjar Lia’s “The al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri: A Profile.”

In some ways, Nasar’s writing reminds us of the late Saudi jihadist Yusuf al-Ayiri’s, especially since both not only preached, but actually participated in jihad